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PARTIAL REDEMPTION IN COLORADO FORECLOSURES
MORRIS B. HOFFMAN*
INTRODUCTION
When co-owners' of real property have different sets of creditors,
and when one of those creditors forecloses, the redemption rights of all
the creditors must be sorted out in the foreclosure process. Although
several recent Colorado appellate court decisions have addressed this
difficult issue, their inconsistent results reflect a conflict between two
fundamental principles of real property, and suggest the time has come
for the General Assembly to overhaul the redemption statute to provide
clearer guidelines on partial redemption.
Here is the typical partial redemption example: H and W own undi-
vided half interests in Blueacre. Bank 1 is the beneficiary of a purchase
money deed of trust on all of Blueacre, securing the purchase money
note which H and W both signed. C is a judgment creditor of H only,
2
* Shareholder and Director, Mosley, Wells, Johnson & Ruttum, P.C., Denver,
Colo.; University of Colorado, J.D. (1977), B.A. (1974).
1. The term "co-owners" is used in this article to include both joint tenants and
tenants in common, two of the three basic kinds of co-owners of real property. See generally
2 D. NILES & W. WALSH, AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 6.1-6.6 (1952); 4A POWELL ON
REAL PROPERTY § 599 (Castleman rev. 1989); 4 J. GRIMES, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY
§§ 1770-1773 (repl. ed. 1979). The third form of co-ownership-tenancy by the en-
tirety-was either abolished in Colorado long ago by the Married Women's Acts, CoLo.
REV. STAT. §§ 14-2-201-210 (Repi. Vol. 1987), or is now so indistinguishable from joint
tenancy as to not warrant separate description. Compare Whyman v. Johnson, 62 Colo.
461, 163 P. 76 (1917) and 2 D. NILES & W. WALSH, AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.6 n. 34
(1952) (listing Colorado as one of eight states abolishing tenancy by the entirety, and cit-
ing Whyman as authority) with Marsh, Tenancy by the Entirety in Colorado, 13 COLO. LAW. 230
(1984) (in which Professor Marsh suggests that such a reading of Whyman is incorrect, and
that a tenancy by the entirety can still be created in Colorado by express provision in a
deed).
In any event, none of the cases has to date suggested that the issue of partial redemp-
tion should be examined differently for one type of co-ownership than for another.
2. That is, C's judgment is not within the scope of the family purpose doctrine, codi-
fied at COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-6-110 (1987 Repl. Vol.), under which C's judgment lien, if
based on an obligation for "the expenses of the family [or] the education of the children,"
would reach both H's and W's interests in Blueacre.
An additional foreclosure complication which this hypothetical ignores is presented
by the Colorado Homestead Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-41-201-211 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
That Act in effect immunizes from execution the first $20,000 of equity in the family home-
stead, and requires an executing creditor to comply with a series of procedures (including
appraisals) designed to prove the existence of this equity cushion as a condition of execu-
tion.
In Frank v. First Nat'l Bank, 653 P.2d 748 (Colo. App. 1982), the Colorado Court of
Appeals not only held that the Homestead Act applied to public trustee foreclosures, but
also held that the homestead waiver contained in the typical form deed of trust was ineffec-
tive to waive the homestead exemption vis-a-vis a third-party bidder at the foreclosure
sale. The apparent result of Frank was that any third-party bidder would have to bid at
least $20,000 more than the amount of the foreclosing creditors' lien, even though the
foreclosing creditor himself had obtained a waiver of the homestead.
The General Assembly quickly overruled Frank, by providing that a homestead waiver
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and has a judgment lien on H's undivided half interest in Blueacre jun-
ior to Bank l's interest.3 Bank 2 is the beneficiary of a second deed of
trust on all of Blueacre, securing a second note which H and W both
executed after C's judgment lien was perfected.4 When Bank 1 fore-
closes, may (or must) C redeem the entire interest in Blueacre (even
though C has only a lien on H's half interest), and thereby force Bank 2
to redeem the entire interest from C, or may (or must) C redeem only
his partial interest?
Similar difficulties arise when the partial interest results not from
undivided co-ownership but rather from creditors of a single owner hav-
ing different interests in different parcels of real property: A owns Par-
cel 1 and Parcel 2. Both parcels are encumbered by a single first deed of
trust, and Parcel 1 is encumbered by a second deed of trust. When the
beneficiary of the first deed of trust forecloses, must the beneficiary of
the second deed of trust redeem the entire property from the sale, or
can he somehow apportion the sale price between the parcels and re-
deem only his Parcel 2?
The junior redemption provisions of the Colorado foreclosure stat-
ute 5 are not nearly as clear as they could be on these questions. 6 This
statutory ambiguity has allowed the appellate courts to look at these is-
sues with an eye toward two fundamental and fundamentally conflicting
sets of policies.
On the one hand, public policies favoring the maximization of fore-
closure prices and the certainty and predictability of the foreclosure pro-
cess led the Colorado Supreme Court to adopt a general rule against
partial redemption. That is, ajunior lienor with only a partial interest in
the foreclosed property must nevertheless redeem the entire property
from the sale, or lose his lien.
7
On the other hand, it is a basic tenet of co-ownership that the inter-
ests of one co-owner may not be used to satisfy the debts of the other
co-owner. In the case of separately encumbered parcels, it is also a basic
tenet that a creditor with a lien on one piece of property cannot extend
contained in a deed of trust is effective to waive the homestead for any purchaser or re-
deemer acquiring the property through foreclosure of that deed of trust. COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 38-41-212 (Repl. Vol. 1982). In so doing, however, the General Assembly codified that
portion of Frank which held that the Homestead Act did in fact apply to the foreclosure of
deeds of trust, mortgages and other consensual liens, a proposition not at all evident from
the language of the two statutes. Of course, as a practical matter, no foreclosure of consen-
sual liens need any longer be complicated with homestead issues, since lenders are now
universally insisting on homestead waivers now that those waivers have been made fully
effective by the post-Frank amendments.
3. Although there has been considerable controversy over this question, it is now
clear that Colorado's recording statute, CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-35-109 (Repl. Vol. 1982), is
a so-called "race-notice" statute. That is, the person who first records his interest without
notice or knowledge of conflicting unrecorded interests, takes priority. Cf. Page v. Fees-
Krey, Inc., 617 P.2d 1188 (Colo. 1980), holding that the predecessor to this recording
statute was a "pure notice" statute.
4. Thus, Bank 2's interest is junior to C's interest. See supra note 3.
5. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-39-103 (Repl. Vol. 1982 and Supp. 1987).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 21-27.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 28-37.
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his lien to a second property not covered by the lien. As we will see,
these basic principles have recently led the court in some limited circum-
stances to an interpretation of the statute allowing, and indeed requir-
ing, partial redemption. 8
THE REDEMPTION STATUTE
Under the current statute, the owner of foreclosed non-agricultural
real estate has 75 days after the sale within which to redeem, by paying
the public trustee or sheriff the sales price plus interest, taxes and other
proper charges. 9 After the expiration of the owner's redemption pe-
riod, lienors with interests junior to the foreclosing creditor have similar
and sequential rights to redeem. 10
An example serves to illustrate the process. Owner owns Redacre,





Creditor D $ 10,000
Creditor A forecloses, and bids in the full amount of his debt, plus
various foreclosure costs, for a total of $210,000. Creditor A need not
come up with any cash, since he is credited for the amount of his debt
and certain proper foreclosure charges. 1 If he is the highest bidder, he
8. See infra text accompanying notes 38-50.
9. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-39-102(1) (Supp. 1987). By contrast, the owner of"agri-
cultural" real estate is allotted six months within which to redeem. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-
39-102(2)(a) (Supp. 1987). "Agricultural real estate" is by recent statutory amendment
defined as property which is (1) completely unsubdivided, and (2) if located in an incorpo-
rated town or city, assessed as agricultural. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-39-102(3)(a) (Supp.
1987). The predecessor to this statute defined "agricultural real estate" simply as any real
estate which was not subdivided. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-39-102(3)(a) (Repl. Vol. 1982).
See also Rowe v. Tucker, 38 Colo. App. 532, 560 P.2d 843 (1977)(mining property is "agri-
cultural" under old definition, since it was not subdivided).
In addition to the redemption distinction between "agricultural" and "non-agricul-
tural" property, recent statutory changes have recognized a further sub-category of agri-
cultural real estate-"agricultural residences." COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-39-102.5 (Supp.
1987). This new statute-a response to the "family farm crisis"-imposes many additional
procedural and substantive conditions on the foreclosure and redemption of agricultural
residences, and is beyond the scope of this article.
10. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-39-103(1) (Supp. 1987).
11. Of course, nothing requires foreclosing creditors to bid in the amount of their debt.
They are free to bid more or less, although each of these alternatives is fraught with vary-
ing degrees of danger.
If they bid more, they must pay the difference in cash. They will want to do this only if
they believe the value of the property justifies it, and especially only if there are competing
bids at the sale or a risk of junior redemption. Although competitive bidders sometime
attend sales, in the author's experience virtually all foreclosure sales are attended only-by
the foreclosing creditor, who almost never bids in more than his debt. Indeed, foreclosure
sales so seldomly involve competitive bids that the statute was recently amended to permit
the foreclosing creditor to submit his bid by letter. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-37-142 (Supp.
1990]
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is issued a certificate of purchase, 12 which serves to identify him as the
person entitled either to be repaid (if there is a subsequent redemption)
or to be issued a public trustee's deed to the property (if there is no
subsequent redemption).
1 3
Assuming Redacre is "non-agricultural,"1 4 Owner has 75 days after
the sale within which to redeem, by paying the $210,000 in cash or certi-
fied funds to the public trustee, plus post-sale interest at the note rate,
plus certain other proper post-sale charges.'
5
If Owner fails to redeem during his redemption period, Creditors
B, C, and D have sequential rights to redeem, provided they have filed
notices of intent to redeem prior to the expiration of Owner's redemp-
tion period. 16 Creditor B has ten days after the expiration of Owner's
redemption period within which to redeem, followed by Creditors C and
D, each of whom have five days.'
7
Creditor B can redeem by paying to the public trustee the $210,000
sale price plus interest and the proper post-sale charges; that is, the first
junior redeemer's redemption price is exactly the same as the Owner's
redemption price (plus, of course, any additional interest). And, like the
Owner but unlike the foreclosing creditor, Creditor B must pay these
monies to the public trustee in cash or certified funds. The public
trustee then pays these funds over to Creditor A, takes back A's certifi-
1987). Junior redemption is a similarly rare occurrence. As a result, foreclosing creditors
very seldom will bid in more than the amount of their debt.
It is much more common for a creditor to bid in less than the amount of his debt,
particularly in times of falling real estate prices. If the creditor believes the property is
worth less than his debt, then he may bid in the lesser amount and retain the right to sue
his borrower for the deficiency. (Colorado, unlike some states, does not yet have a so-
called anti-deficiency statute. Cf. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580 (West 1976 & Supp. 1989).
There are, however, dangers to which a creditor exposes himself when he bids less than
the amount of the debt.
First, of course, he risks being redeemed out for the amount of his low bid, either by
the owner or by junior redeemers, thus losing all rights to the collateral. Again, however,
the realities of forced sales, and especially forced sales in a declining real estate market,
mean that these risks of redemption are often more theoretical than real. This has em-
boldened many foreclosing creditors, who see the foreclosure as an opportunity to bid in a
low price, artificially create a deficiency, and end up with both the collateral and a con-
cocted deficiency against the debtor.
Courts have responded to the most egregious of these cases by stepping in and undo-
ing the foreclosure sale. See, e.g., Chew v. Acacia Mut. Life Ins., 165 Colo. 43, 437 P.2d
339 (1968); Tekai Corp. v. Transamerica Title Ins., 39 Colo. App. 528, 571 P.2d 321
(1977). Although the law in this area is not yet fully developed, the cautious foreclosing
creditor should never bid in less than the amount of his debt, unless he has an appraisal
justifying the bid and is prepared to defend the appraisal against an inadequacy attack. See
generally, Johnson & Hoffman, Inadequacy of Sales Price at Judicially Ordered Sales of Real Prop-
erty, 12 COLO. LAw. 1435 (1983).
12. COLO. REV, STAT. § 38-39-115(2) (Supp. 1987).
13. Certificates of purchase are freely assignable. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-39-116
(Supp. 1987).
14. See supra note 9.
15. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-39-102 (Supp. 1987).
16. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-39-103 (Supp. 1987).
17. Recent amendments have clarified that these junior redemption periods are fixed
in time at the expiration of the owner's redemption period; that is, an early junior redemp-
tion will not accelerate subsequent redemption periods. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-39-103(2)
(Supp. 1987).
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cate of purchase, and issues Creditor B a certificate of redemption.' 8
Creditor C then has five days after the expiration of Creditor B's
five-day period within which to redeem. Creditor C must pay the
$210,000 plus proper post-sale costs plus the amount of principal and
interest owed to Creditor B. 19 Thus, Creditor C must pay $210,000
plus $100,000, or $310,000, plus post-sale costs and interest. The pub-
lic trustee then issues Creditor C a certificate of redemption, pays Credi-
tor B his $310,000 and interest and costs, takes back B's-certificate of
redemption, and issues Creditor C a certificate of redemption.
Creditor D goes through precisely the same procedures; he must
pay the $210,000 sale price plus the amounts of B's and C's liens, plus
costs and interest. In our example, Creditor D must pay a total of
$410,000 plus costs and interest.
2 0
Though there are several unresolved issues related even to this sim-
ple redemption situation, 2 1 for the most part the process seems to run
smoothly and without serious difficulties.
However, when the situation is complicated with co-ownership, thus
raising the issue of partial redemption, the statutory scheme breaks
down. That is because the statutory language on junior redemption
simply does not deal, and has never dealt, with the possibility that ajun-
ior redeemer's lien encumbers less property than the lien of the fore-
closing creditor, in either sense of the word "less"-less because it
encumbers only an undivided interest or less because it encumbers only
a divided parcel of the whole.
Consider our earlier example, but assume Creditor B's $100,000
interest encumbers only an undivided one-half interest in Redacre. If
Creditor B wishes to redeem from Creditor A's foreclosure, does Credi-
tor B have the right or obligation to redeem the entire property (by pay-
ing the full redemption price of $210,000), or does he redeem only the
undivided half to which his lien attaches (by paying only one-half of the
$210,000 foreclosure sale price)?
If Creditor B fully redeems by paying the full $210,000, then Credi-
tor C and D redeem as if Creditor B were an ordinary lienor with an
interest in all of Redacre; that is, Creditor C redeems by paying
$310,000, and Creditor D redeems by paying $410,000. This, of course,
18. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-39-104 (Supp. 1987).
19. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-39-103(1) (Supp. 1987). This amount is determined by
Creditor B filing, at the time he redeems, an affidavit stating the amount owed to him.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-39-103(3) (Supp. 1987).
20. See generally Quail, The Statutory Right of Redemption from Foreclosure, 13 COLO. LAW.
793 (1984).
21. For example, the statute does not clearly indicate whether all prior junior lienors
who file timely notices of intent to redeem must be paid off, or only those who themselves
redeem. The latter interpretation seems to make most sense, and in the author's experi-
ence it is the interpretation adopted by virtually all public trustees. In his dissent in First
Nat'l Bank v. Energy Fuels Corp., 200 Colo. 540, 547, 618 P.2d 1115, 1120 (1980),Justice
Lohr suggests this result by stating that the junior liens that must be paid off are those that
were "used to effect prior redemption." There is, however, no case directly on point, and
the statutory language is also quite susceptible of the other interpretation.
1990]
66 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:1
means that Creditor B must come up with sufficient cash to redeem all of
Redacre even though he only has an interest in half of it.
If, however, Creditor B is allowed or required to partially redeem
by paying only $105,000, then he acquires a certificate of redemption
only as to half of Redacre. What then are the redemption rights of
Creditors C and D? The statute is not only unclear about the precise
effects of partial redemption, it is, as we shall see, unclear about whether
partial redemption is even permissible.
Prior to 1931, the applicable law required the redeeming lienor to
pay "all redemption amounts previously paid,"2 2 suggesting that even
though ajunior redeemer's lien ran only to a partial interest in the prop-
erty, he was nevertheless required to redeem the entire property if he
wished to redeem any of it.23 Even this conclusion was of some doubt,
however, given the modifying phrase in the pre-1931 version of this stat-
ute, which provided that the junior redemption was to be made "accord-
ing to the priority of [the redeemer's] lien."' 24 The argument is that the
"priority" of a junior redeemer's partial interest is measured only with
respect to that partial interest. Thus, if he has a second deed of trust
only as to half of the property, he has the right to redeem only that half.
In 1931, this junior redemption language was revised to its current
form:
[E]ach subsequent encumbrancer and lienor in succession ...
may redeem . . . by paying all redemption amounts theretofore
paid with interest and the amount of all such liens with interest
prior to his own held by such persons as are evidenced in the
manner required in this section .... 25
Although this revised statutory language retains the requirement
that the junior redeemer pay "all redemption amounts previously
paid"-thus suggesting there can be no partial redemption-it adds the
requirement that the junior redeemer also pay "all such liens with inter-
est prior to his own held by such persons as are evidenced in the manner
required by this section." 2 6 By referring to prior liens, some courts have
suggested that this language, like its predecessor, means a junior lienor
need redeem only from that portion of a foreclosing interest that was in
fact prior to his own interest; that is, partial redemption is permissible.
2 7
That conclusion seems to be quite a leap of faith, however. The
obvious purpose of the addition is to clarify the situation that arises
when there are multiple junior redemptions. As set forth in the earlier
examples, the last junior redeemer must pay not only what the prior
redeemer paid, but also must pay that prior redeemer's lien. 28 To sug-
gest that the 1931 legislature had the idea of partial redemption in mind
22. 1929 Colo. Sess. Laws 538-39.
23. See infra text accompanying note 32.
24. 1929 Colo. Sess. Laws 538-39.
25. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-39-103(1) (Supp. 1987).
26. Id.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 39-43.
28. See supra text accompanying notes 17-20.
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any more than its predecessors did is to read quite a lot into an already
ambiguous paragraph of the statute. Nevertheless, as we will see, these
ambiguities-both pre- and post-1931-gave the Colorado Supreme
Court just enough elbow room to address the issue of partial redemp-
tion with other policy considerations in mind.
WALKER V. WALLACE: PARTIAL REDEMPTION IS PROHIBITED
Although it had suggested the result earlier, 29 in the 1926 case of
Walker v. Wallace3 0 the Colorado Supreme Court held for the first time
that a junior lienor with only a partial interest could, and in fact must,
redeem the entire property if it wanted to redeem at all. Walker involved
a foreclosing creditor of both co-owners, and a junior judgment lienor
of one of the co-owners. The foreclosing creditor was the successful
bidder at the foreclosure sale. The junior judgment lienor tendered the
full sale price in an effort to redeem, but the foreclosing creditor refused
to accept the money, arguing that the junior lienor could not redeem the
entire property when he held an interest only in an undivided half.
The trial court held that the foreclosing creditor was justified in re-
fusing the entire redemption amount, impliedly ruling that the junior
lienor with only a partial interest could redeem only as to that partial
interest. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed. It adopted the gen-
eral rule, recognized in many other states, that in the absence of a stat-
ute to the contrary "property which has been sold in an execution sale in
its entirety or en masse, if redeemed at all, must be redeemed en
masse."
3 1
The court looked at the statutory language then in effect-the re-
deemer had to pay "all redemption amounts previously paid"-and had
no difficulty interpreting this language to prohibit partial redemption,
3 2
with the aid of an Illinois case construing an identical Illinois provi-
29. In Leach v. Torbert, 71 Colo. 85, 204 P. 334 (1922), the supreme court did not
have to reach the partial redemption issue, since one of the putative junior redeemers in
fact had no judgment lien which attached to the foreclosed property. However, the court
permitted a second junior redeemer-who did have a record interest in an undivided half
of the foreclosed property-to proceed with his lawsuit seeking redemption of the entire
property. The case turned on procedural issues, and the court did not confront the partial
redemption issue head on. However, by allowing the redeemer to proceed, the court at
least suggested that he could not be forced by others to redeem partially.
30. 79 Colo. 380, 246 P. 553 (1926).
31. Id. at 384. The cases which the Walker court cited from other jurisdictions are:
Tribble v. Wood, 186 Ala. 329, 65 So. 73 (1914); Oldfield v. Eulert, 148 I11. 614, 36 N.E.
615 (1893); Sharpe v. Baker, 51 Ind. App. 547, 96 N.E. 627 (1911); Powers v. Sherry, 115
Minn. 290, 132 N.W. 210 (1911); O'Brien v. Kreuz, 36 Minn. 136, 30 N.W. 458 (1886);
Martin v. Sprague, 29 Minn. 53, 11 N.W. 143 (1882).
Technically, the narrow holding of Walker was that a junior lienor with a partial inter-
est could, if he wished, redeem the entire property. The Walker court was not faced with
the issue of whether such a junior lienor must redeem the entire property. Thus, the
quoted language indicating that partial redemption is prohibited, was actually dictum.
That dictum became a holding in Chain-O-Mines v. Williamson, 101 Colo. 231, 72 P.2d
265 (1937). See infra note 38.
32. See supra text accompanying note 23.
1990]
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sion. 33 It did not address the "according to the priority of his lien" lan-
guage, which arguably suggests a contrary result.
34
In Walker the court went on to justify its decision on broader policy
grounds, namely that by prohibiting partial redemption, it was insuring
that foreclosed property would be used to satisfy as many debts as possi-
ble.3 5 In addition, under the facts in Walker, this full use of the property
did not injure anyone, since the foreclosing creditor was fully repaid.
36
Unmentioned, of course, is the fact that the redeeming creditor ob-
tained a windfall by acquiring 100% of the equity in the property
(though, admittedly, he had to pay 100% of the senior debt), even
though his interest attached only to fifty percent.
37
The Walker rule was extended in 1937 to the partial-redemption-by-
parcel situation, when the court ruled that a junior lienor as to one par-
cel had to redeem en masse as to all the foreclosed parcels.
38
33. Durley v. Davis, 69 Ill. 133 (1873).
34. See supra text accompanying note 24.
35.
The property is thus made to pay as many debts of the judgment debtors and
each of them as is possible, whereas, if Walker did not have the right to redeem
the entire property of the judgment debtors, there having been no redemption by
them, it would be appropriated to the payment of one only of the two debts.
Walker, 79 Colo. at 385-86, 246 P. at 555.
36.
The plaintiff Wallace cannot possibly be injured for there has been tendered
to the sheriff for his use the entire amount which he bid at the sale, with all inter-
est and costs .... Nothing has been taken from him. He will receive his entire
claim against these two tenants in common of the property, who were his judg-
ment debtors.
Id. at 385.
37. For example, assume that the property had a value of$100,000, that $50,000 was
owed on the first deed of trust, and $20,000 on the judgment lien encumbering only half
the property. Assume also that the holder of the first deed of trust foreclosed, and was the
successful bidder by biding in his full $50,000 debt. If the owner fails to redeem, then the
foreclosing creditor and the judgment creditor are fighting over a substantial equity. If the
judgment creditor is allowed to redeem the entire property by paying off the first, he ac-
quires all of the equity ($100,000 in value less $50,000 to redeem less the $20,000 already
owed to him, for a total of $30,000), and the foreclosing creditor acquires none of it. If the
judgment creditor is allowed only to redeem the undivided half to which his lien attaches,
he acquires only a small fraction of the equity ($50,000 in value less $25,000 to redeem
less the $20,000 already owed to him, for a total of $5,000). Even this calculation assumes
that the value of an undivided half interest in property is half of the value of the whole, an
assumption of questionable accuracy: "It requires no appraisal expertise to conclude that
an undivided one-half interest in a piece of real property is not worth one-half the value of
the entire real property." First Nat'l Bank v. Energy Fuels Corp., 618 P.2d 1115, n.3
(1980) (Lohr, J., dissenting). If an undivided half interest is in fact worth less than one-
half of the value of the whole, a partial redemption is even less attractive to the junior
partial lienor.
It is this battle over equity which drives the dispute between the putative partial re-
deemer and other creditors with liens on the entire property.
Conversely, if there is not enough value in the property to satisfy all the debts, then
the partial creditor will not want to be forced to redeem the entire property, and he and
the full creditor reverse roles on this issue of whether partial redemption should be al-
lowed and whether it should be mandatory.
38. Chain-O-Mines v. Williamson, 101 Colo. 231, 72 P.2d 265 (1937). This case in-
volved an option to purchase a portion of a group of mining claims. Citing Walker, the
court refused to allow the redemption of a portion of claims from a foreclosure of the
entire group.
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FIRST NATIONAL BANK V. ENERGY FUELS CORP.: PARTIAL REDEMPTION IS
REQUIRED
The Colorado Supreme Court did not have another opportunity to
examine the question of partial redemption until 1980, when it decided
First Nat' Bank of Southglenn v. Energy Fuels.3 9 In that case, a husband and
wife owned their residence in joint tenancy, and had executed a first
deed of trust for the benefit of an unnamed bank (Bank 1). Energy Fuels
was ajudgment creditor of husband only, and perfected ajudgment lien
against husband's interest in the property, junior to Bank l's interest.
After that perfection, husband and wife executed a second deed of trust
on the property for the benefit of Chatfield Bank, and then a third deed
of trust on the property for the benefit of First National Bank.
Bank I foreclosed, was the successful bidder at the sale, and ac-
quired a certificate of purchase to the property. Energy Fuels, Chatfield,
and First National Bank all filed timely notices of their intent to redeem,
and each deposited with the public trustee amounts sufficient to redeem
the entire property from Bank 1.
The public trustee, in accordance with the holding of Walker, con-
cluded that Energy Fuels had the first right (and, indeed, obligation if it
wanted to redeem at all) to redeem the entire property even though its
lien attached only to husband's undivided half interest. Chatfield filed
suit in the district court, arguing for partial redemption-that is, that it
had the first right of redemption with respect to wife's half interest, and
that Energy Fuels had the first right of redemption only with respect to
husband's half interest.
The district court agreed with Chatfield, and Energy Fuels ap-
pealed. The court of appeals, also relying on Walker, held that no partial
redemption was permissible, let alone required, and that Energy Fuels
had the first right of redemption with respect to the entire property.40
The Colorado Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Erickson
and with a dissent by Justice Lohr, reversed the court of appeals, hold-
ing that the redemption rights were to be prioritized as to each undi-
vided half interest. It distinguished Walker on this key fact: In Walker,
there were no lienors junior to the redeeming partial lienor. Therefore,
no one was injured by the partial lienor's full redemption (except, as
discussed above, in not obtaining the equity windfall). 4 1 In the Energy
Fuels case, however, if Energy Fuels were allowed to redeem the entire
interest, the subsequent lienors-Chatfield and First National Bank-
would be forced to redeem the entire interest, and this would have the
indirect result of using wife's half interest in the property to pay hus-
band's judgment (assuming, of course, that the amount of the judgment
against husband was more than the value of husband's undivided half
interest in the equity in the property).42
39. 618 P.2d 1115 (Colo. 1980).
40. Chatfield Bank v. Energy Fuels Corp., 42 Colo. App. 233, 599 P.2d 923 (1979).
41. Energy Fuels, 618 P.2d at 1119. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
42. For example, assume that the property was worth $200,000 (that is, each undi-
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The Court also distinguished Walker on the basis of the statutory
change in 1931, emphasizing the added phrase "and the amount of all
such liens prior to his own." The majority concluded that this language
suggested the redeeming lienor could not redeem the entire property,
since the foreclosing creditor's lien was "prior" only to an undivided
half of the redeemer's lien.
43
Justice Lohr's dissent attacked the majority opinion both as a matter
of statutory interpretation and on policy grounds. He emphasized the
first phrase of the redemption provision-"pay all redemption
amounts"-and quite correctly pointed out that the second phrase was
obviously added merely to address the situation of multiple junior re-
demption, and not to permit partial redemption. 44 He also invoked the
general rule announced in Walker that partial redemption should not be
allowed in the absence of clear statutory authority otherwise. 4 5 Finally,
while conceding that a "no partial redemption" rule can in some circum-
stances do violence to the common law precept that the property of one
co-owner cannot be used to satisfy the debts of the other co-owner,
4 6
vided half was worth $100,000), that Bank l's purchase money note had a balance of
$100,000 at the time of the sale, that Bank I successfully bid the full $100,000 at the sale,
and that the amount of Energy Fuel's judgment against H was $75,000 at the time of the
sale. If Energy Fuels were allowed to redeem the entire property from Bank l's purchase,
then Chatfield could redeem from Energy Fuels for $175,000 ($100,000 to Bank 1;
$75,000 to Energy Fuels). If that happened, then $50,000 of each of I-'s and W's interest
would have gone to pay Bank 1, and $37,500 each would have gone to pay Energy Fuels.
Thus, a significant portion of the value of W's undivided interest ($37,500 out of $50,000)
would have gone to pay H's debt to Energy Fuels.
The Energy Fuels court correctly recognized that the existence of a lienor junior to the
redeemer raised the possibility of this inequity, and distinguished Walker on that basis:
"Walker concerned only one creditor seeking to redeem. This case involves competing
lienholders who each possess a superior lien on separate interests of real property held in
joint tenancy." 618 P.2d at 1119.
However, as discussed in more detail in note 63 infra and in the text accompanying
notes 64-66 infra, the majority opinion is a bit disingenuous in describing this problem as
"using wife's property to pay husband's debts." By the time partial redemption becomes
an issue, the owners' redemption period has already expired, and neither husband nor
wife has any interest in, let alone any equity in, the property. Any "inequity" lies in giving
this windfall to husband's creditor instead of the joint creditor, and this may not be inequi-
table at all. Id.
43. "The applicable redemption statute in 1926 was markedly different from sec-
tion 38-39-103(1), C.R.S. 1973." Id. at 1119. Footnote 5 states, "Section 5951,
Compiled Laws of Colorado 1921 stated that the redeeming lienor must only pay
'the amount of money for which said premises shall have been sold.' Section 38-
39-103(1), C.R.S. 1973, requires this lienor to also pay the 'amount of ... liens
• . . prior to his own.' This 'prior to his own' language forms the basis of our
decision and was not present in Walker." Id.
44. See supra text accompanying note 28.
45. "Although statutory content governs the results of statutory redemption cases, it
is worthy of note that the general rule is 'that a mortgage is an entire thing, and must be
redeemed as such, and that the mortgagee cannot be compelled to divide his debt and his
security'." 618 P.2d at 1121 (Lohr,J., dissenting, quoting 9 G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES
ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 745 (1958)).
46.
The majority correctly points out that to [deny partial redemption] utilizes
Kathleen Pickering's property to reduce Ben Pickering's debt. However, the con-
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Justice Lohr articulated two policies which disfavored partial redemp-
tion: maximizing foreclosure prices (a policy recognized by the Walker
court) and the policy of maintaining certainty and predictability in fore-
closure proceedings.
The policy of maximizing foreclosure prices is a longstanding one,
which the majority rule allowing partial redemption undoubtedly dam-
ages. Foreclosure prices-already depressed by the realities of forced
sale-will feel even more downward pressure as foreclosing creditors
face the harrowing prospect of waking up one day with an uninvited co-
owner. Lenders may even be less willing to make real estate loans at the
outset. It is difficult enough for secured lenders to minimize bad loan
losses through foreclosure, let alone to have to try to cut those losses by
selling undivided interests.
However, Justice Lohr does not explain in any detail why the major-
ity's rule requiring partial redemption in these circumstances introduces
any special uncertainty or unpredictability in the foreclosure process.
True, when a creditor takes a lien encumbering only part of a piece of
real property (either an undivided interest in all the property, or an in-
terest in a separate parcel), he has no way of knowing at that time
whether junior lienors as to all of the property might come along. If
they do, Energy Fuels says our creditor will not be able to redeem the
entire property from foreclosure by a senior creditor. If they do not,
Walker says our creditor must redeem the entire property. This undoubt-
edly puts our creditor in a somewhat uncertain position. However, this
uncertainty can be avoided entirely, at least in the single parcel situa-
tion, if our creditor takes his security interest in all of the property.
True, some lienors (such as judgment lienors) have no choice but to take
their interest in only a part of the property, but the very fact that these
kinds of involuntary lien creditors have no choice means any uncertainty
about the value of their liens will have little or no commercial impact at
the outset of transactions. This author is not aware of any lenders who
intentionally and regularly make loans collateralized by undivided inter-
ests in real property. Indeed, almost all of the significant Colorado
cases on partial redemption, not surprisingly, have involved a redeemer
whose partial interest arose by way of an involuntary lien. Under these
circumstances, it is difficult to imagine how a rule requiring partial re-
demption will cause any special uncertainty in the foreclosure process.
Moreover, the identity of all junior lienors is fixed at the expiration
of the owner's redemption period, 4 7 so our creditor will know before he
tenders his redemption amount whether he may redeem the whole
property or only his portion. Thus, any uncertainty disappears before
the junior lienor must make his decision to redeem.
Finally, in view of several fundamental questions which still abound
in the area of junior redemption-including, for example, what the re-
deemer must pay and to whom4 8 -it is hard to imagine that partial re-
47. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-39-103(2) (Supp. 1987).
48. See supra note 21.
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demption will introduce any more uncertainty than is already currently
embedded in the redemption process.
Justice Lohr's statutory construction argument is much more diffi-
cult to avoid. Even if it cannot be said that the current statute unequivo-
cally prohibits partial redemption, it certainly does not unequivocally
mandate it. The fact is that the statute is hopelessly ambiguous on this
issue, as it is on many other redemption issues. These ambiguities were
not eliminated by the 1931 amendments, but in fact in some ways may
have been exacerbated by them.
49
Before Energy Fuels, the law in Colorado and elsewhere was that par-
tial redemption would not be allowed absent a clear statutory directive.
This was the touchstone of the Walker case. Although Justice Erickson's
opinion in Energy Fuels may make good policy sense, it seems to do con-
siderable violence to the Walker precedent recognizing a built-in pre-
sumption against partial redemption. Perhaps Justice Lohr's complaint
of "uncertainty and unpredictability" was aimed not at the notion of
partial redemption itself, but at the deeper target of the court's own fail-
ure to respect its precedent in this area.
In any event, one might at least argue that Energy Fuels settled t is
matter of partial redemption once and for all by drawing a clear line
between the circumstances when one may only partially redeem, and
when one must redeem the entire property. As two recent cases have
demonstrated, however, this line is not nearly as clear as it might seem.
THE GRAY AREA
Once the Energy Fuels Court let the genie of partial redemption out
of the bottle, it soon became evident that the endless variety of foreclo-
sure conditions would raise endless questions of exactly where the
Walker rule ends and the Energy Fuels exception begins.
For example, in Sant v. Stephens50 the federal district court was faced
with a redemption issue complicated by the fact that separate foreclo-
sure proceedings were commenced against the same property. The
holder of a deed of trust on co-owned property began the first proceed-
ing, foreclosing on the entire property, and the holder of a second deed
of trust encumbering only an undivided half interest in the property
commenced a second foreclosure only as to that undivided half. The
sale on the partial interest took place before the sale on the entire inter-
est, presumably because the full foreclosure sale was continued. A mu-
nicipality held a statutory lien for unpaid utility assessments as to the
entire property, 5 1 and its assignee did not redeem from the foreclosure
on the partial interest, but did redeem from the foreclosure on the en-
tire property. An understandably befuddled public trustee issued a pub-
49. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27
50. 580 F. Supp. 1003 (D. Colo. 1983).
51. One of the critical issues in the case was whether this kind of statutory lien did in
fact give rise to a right of junior redemption. The Colorado Supreme Court ultimately
ruled that it did. Sant v. Stephens, 753 P.2d 752 (Colo. 1988).
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lic trustee's deed on all of the property to the redeemer from the full
sale, followed a few days later by a public trustee's deed on an undivided
half of the property to the third-party bidder at the partial sale. The
redeemer sued.
The federal district court ruled that by failing to redeem from the
partial foreclosure sale (which, remember, occurred before the foreclo-
sure sale on the entire property), the redeemer somehow lost his right to
redeem from the second sale on the entire property. 52 The redeemer
appealed, and the Tenth Circuit certified the question to the Colorado
Supreme Court. In an opinion written by justice Lohr, the Colorado
Supreme Court ruled that there was no such waiver.
53
Exactly how does Energy Fuels, which was cited extensively injustice
Lohr's majority opinion, help decide this waiver issue? At first blush,
Energy Fuels seems entirely inapposite to either of the foreclosure sales in
Sant. The partial interest which was foreclosed was never redeemed and
the entire interest which was foreclosed was redeemed by a junior lienor
holding an interest in the entire property. Partial redemption was never
an issue in either sale.
Nevertheless, the policies discussed in Energy Fuels are at the heart
of the dispute in Sant, although not in the guise of partial redemption. If
we say the junior redeemer in Sant waived his right to redeem from the
second full sale by failing to redeem from the first partial sale, then what
we are really saying is that a lienor with an interest in all of the property
must redeem from a foreclosure on a partial interest. If we require that,
then under certain circumstances of valuation we would be using the
property of one co-owner to pay the debts of another, in violation of the
sacred principle articulated in Energy Fuels.
The majority in Sant incanted this principle as a justification for its
holding that there was no waiver. 54 Chief Justice Quinn acknowledged
-this policy in his Sant dissent, but asserted the competing policies of
"maximizing the price obtained at a foreclosure sale . . .and bringing
about certainty and predictability to foreclosure proceedings." '5 5 Sound
familiar? We have in Sant the same old battle lines that were drawn in
Energy Fuels, with the interesting twist that Justice Lohr, the Energy Fuels
dissenter, is now taking the Energy Fuels majority at its word and ex-
tending the principles of Energy Fuels to the multi-foreclosure situation
presented in Sant.
If there is anything clear from the two opinions in Sant, it is that the
court is still struggling with the very difficult issue of when the general
policy respecting separate co-ownership of real property gives way to
more specific policies related to the foreclosure process.
52. Sant v. Stephens, 580 F. Supp. 1003 (D. Colo. 1983).
53. 753 P.2d 752 (Colo. 1988).
54. "The district court's holding in this case requires a lienholder on all interests in
the property to redeem from a sale of an undivided interest, and this essentially uses the
interests of two cotenants to satisfy the creditor of one." Id. at 759-60.
55. Id. at 763 (Quinn, J., dissenting).
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Perhaps an even more striking example of this struggle is the recent
court of appeals case of Pheney v. Western Nat'l Bank. 56 In that case, the
owner of 700 acres of real property, secured by a first deed of trust to
Western, divided the acreage into three different parcels and sold each
parcel to different buyers. The sales were each subject to the first deed
of trust. One of the parcels became encumbered with a second deed of
trust for the benefit of M, and another became encumbered with a sec-
ond deed of trust for the benefit of P.
Western foreclosed and obtained a certificate of purchase for all
700 acres by bidding in the full $525,000 owed to it. M (who, remem-
ber, had an interest encumbering only one parcel) gave the public
trustee notice of his intent to redeem the entire 700 acres, and tendered
the full sales price. P (whose interest also only encumbered one parcel)
simultaneously gave notice of his intent to redeem only his 90 acre par-
cel, and proposed to tender $90,000 for that partial redemption on the
theory that the market value of his parcel was only $90,000. The public
trustee refused to let P partially redeem and P sued.
The trial court agreed with the public trustee, and the court of ap-
peals affirmed. In its opinion, the court of appeals says several interest-
ing things about Walker and Energy Fuels, including the statement, rather
bold for an intermediate appellate court, that the Energy Fuels exception
is "facially inconsistent with the statutory requirement that a redeemer
must pay the full amount paid at the foreclosure sale."
5 7
More particularly, the court of appeals identified two reasons for
declining to extend Energy Fuels to the situation before it: (1) the com-
peting lienors are not co-owners, since they own separate parcels, and
therefore Energy Fuels" concerns about having the property of one co-
owner pay the debts of the other co-owner do not apply;5 8 and (2) to
allow partial redemption in this situation requires some determination
of the portion to be partially redeemed-that is, presumably some valua-
tion of P's 90 acres as compared with the entire 700 acres. 59
56. 762 P.2d 693 (Colo. App. 1988), cert. denied October 11, 1988.
57. Id. at 695-96.
58.
While the nature of the interest held by one joint tenant might well mandate
that the interest of the other tenant be protected from an involuntary encum-
brance, we can discern no comparable consideration where, as here, joint tenants
are not involved. On the contrary, in this particular case the encumbrance was
voluntarily created with full knowledge that a superior encumbrance had been
previously created and foreclosed.
Id. at 696.
59.
[T]o determine the value of the 90 acres that are encumbered by plaintiff's
lien, in comparison to the entire 700 acres foreclosed upon, would require the
consideration of evaluation information, which is ofttimes conflicting and contra-
dictory. In our view, a public trustee is ill-equipped to render such evaluation
judgments.
Moreover, we can find nothing in the statute that would justify requiring a
foreclosing creditor, who purchases at the sale, to be subjected to the peril of
such an official's undervaluation of that part of the property for which redemp-
tion is sought.
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The court's concerns about the mechanics of valuation are certainly
well taken. How is the apportionment between the redeemer's parcel
and the entire property to be made? Who is to make this valuation, and
on what possible basis? The public trustee cannot make such a determi-
nation, nor can the Rule 120 court under the currently simplified proce-
dures. Clearly, the statutory scheme is not structured to handle this
valuation inquiry, and to infect the process with this issue would convert
almost all foreclosures in which there are partial redeemers into full-
blown litigation.
60
However, the court of appeals' distinction between co-owners of
one property and a single owner of multiple parcels is more difficult to
understand. As mentioned above, if it is a basic tenet that one co-
owner's property not be used to pay another co-owner's debt, then it is
also a basic tenet, and perhaps even more basic, that a lien limited to
one parcel of A's property does not attach to another of A's parcels,
especially when A sells these parcels off to different buyers. 6 1 For exam-
ple, in the Pheney situation, if P were allowed to redeem the entire 700
acres, if P's debt of $70,000 were greater than his equity in his parcel,
and if M were forced to redeem the entire property for $595,000, then
the situation is identical to Energy Fuels. A's debt to P is being paid with
M's collateral.
Perhaps the Pheney court is telling us that it simply views Energy Fuels
as giving more protection to co-owners of one property than to succes-
sors of a single owner of multiple parcels. But that message is certainly
not clear and its rationale is even less clear. In both situations, junior
partial interests are created, voluntarily or involuntarily, after a senior
interest in the entire property is in place. In both situations, allowing
partial redemption protects one co-owner from having his property used
to pay debts of the other co-owners. There does not seem to be any
reason why the parcel owner in Pheney-who admittedly took title with
knowledge of the all-encompassing senior debt, but without knowledge
of or control over whether the other owners further encumbered their
parcels-should be given any less protection than the husband and wife
in Energy Fuels-who likewise acquired their joint interests with knowl-
edge that the property was fully encumbered (by the purchase-money
mortgage they themselves gave) and with equal inability to control sub-
sequent encumbrancing of the other's undivided interest.
In any event, the one message the court of appeals panel has clearly
sent in Pheney is that it intends to construe the Energy Fuels exception as
narrowly as possible.
6 2
60. Of course, where the partial redemption issue arises out of undivided co-owner-
ship, as opposed to ownership of divided parcels, this valuation problem is not presented.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8.
62. The court of appeals has recently reaffirmed its holding in Pheney by summarily
dismissing a partial redemption argument in the context of multiple parcels. Describing
the Energy Fuels exception as applying only to a "joint tenant's undivided interest in the
property," the court of appeals has again refused to allow partial redemption of a separate
parcel. Stan Miller, Inc. v. Breckenridge Resort Assoc., Inc., 779 P.2d 1365, XIII Brief
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CONCLUSION
After considerable and deft waffling on the issue, the supreme court
seems to have settled on the general rule that partial redemption is pro-
hibited where there are no lienors junior to the partial redeemer in ques-
tion, but that it is required where there are such junior lienors. Although
there is some doubt about whether the statutory language allows the
court this kind of policy-making, the decision which the court did make
in Energy Fuels seems to be a sensible accommodation of several complex
issues, if one accepts the court's premise that to require full redemption
in some circumstances would do an injustice to one of the co-owners.
68
However, that accommodation is by no means complete. For example,
is the rule the same for co-owners as it is for owners of separate parcels?
Should it depend on whether the junior partial interest was voluntarily
or involuntarily created?
It is time for the General Assembly to resolve these questions. As
has been suggested, it should probably make no difference whether the
partial interest is the result of undivided co-ownership of a single parcel,
or multiple ownership of divided parcels. The policy issues in both situ-
ations are precisely the same, although if partial redemption is to be
permitted in the case of multiple ownership of separate parcels, a valua-
tion mechanism will have to be created.
-Nor should it make any difference whether the junior partial interest
was created voluntarily or involuntarily. After all, it is the other co-owner,
the one who did not further encumber his interest, who we are purport-
edly protecting by allowing partial redemption. 64 It should not matter
whether his co-owner voluntary or involuntarily encumbered his inter-
est. In either case the rule of Energy Fuels, if applied at all, should be
applied to prevent one co-owner's property from being used to pay the
other's debts, whether or not those debts are secured with consensual or
non-consensual liens.
All of this leads to one of two conclusions: either Energy Fuels
should be abandoned in its entirety, and the no-partial redemption rule
of Walker applied with no exceptions, or Pheney is wrong, and the Energy
Fuels exception should be applied in any case where there is a redeemer
junior to the partial redeemer. It probably matters more that the Gen-
eral Assembly adopt one or the other of these alternatives, and resolve
this question, than that it adopt one particular alternative versus the
other. If the values of maximizing foreclosure prices and respecting the
Walker precedent together outweigh the policy against the mere possibility
of having the property of one co-owner used to pay the debts of another
co-owner, and it seems a good legislative case for this proposition can
Times Reporter 237 (Colo. App. 1989). The supreme court granted certiorari on Septem-
ber 1!, 1989, and at press time the matter is being briefed.
63. But see note 42 supra and the text accompanying notes 65-66 infra, suggesting that
the relative rights and expectations of the co-owners is never an issue by the time a partial
redemption is contemplated.
64. But see notes 42 and 62 supra.
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be made, then Energy Fuels should be abandoned, and all partial redemp-
tion should be prohibited. That solution would also avoid the difficult
valuation questions which would be created by an extension of the En-
ergy Fuels doctrine to the separate parcel situation.
Perhaps the lower courts' reluctance to extend the Energy Fuels ex-
ception reflects a well-justified skepticism not only with the mechanical
problems which wide-spread partial redemption would introduce, but
also with its underlying policies.
Is it necessarily true that in the Energy Fuels situation the failure to
allow a partial redemption would, as the court claimed and even as the
dissent acknowledged, cause wife's property to be used to pay husband's
debt? No.
Remember, this "inequity" arises only when the value of husband's
half interest is not sufficient to pay both the husband's debt and his
share of the joint debt. It also arises only after the expiration of the
husband and wife's redemption period. If wife wishes to protect her
undivided half interest from husband's sole debt, she need only redeem
from the foreclosure. Such a redemption would restore completely the
equity in her half interest, and keep that equity insulated from husband's
sole creditor.
It is thus not accurate at all to say that Energy Fuels involved a risk of
using wife's property to pay husband's debts. By the time the partial
redemption issue was raised in that case, as in any partial redemption
case, both husband and wife had already lost all of their equity by failing
to redeem. Therefore, the fight there was not between joint owners, but
between the joint owners' creditors, namely between their joint creditor
on the one hand and husband's creditor on the other.6 5 Moreover, the
fight is not even about which creditor should be paid in full, since by
assumption there is enough value to pay everyone. The fight is over
which creditor gets the equity windfall.
It is not at all self-evident that it is "inequitable" to give this wind-
fall to husband's creditor rather than to the joint creditor. On the con-
trary, in any ordinary foreclosure situation, without the complication of
partial redemption, the most junior redeemer always has the last chance
to acquire any equity windfall because he has the last chance to redeem.
There do not appear to be any intrinsic reasons to depart from this rule
simply because the junior redeemer's lien happens to encumber only a
part of the property.
Moreover, as mentioned above, 66 to permit partial redemption in
any circumstance is to subject all lenders to the terrible possibility of
having ownership in their collateral split by a junior partial redemption.
That prospect certainly will do damage to original lenders' expectations,
and will undoubtedly raise the cost ofjointly borrowed purchase money.
In addition to these policy difficulties, partial redemption raises
65. See supra note 42.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
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many mechanical problems not yet addressed by the cases. For exam-
ple, what if both c6-owners have individual partial creditors, and both par-
tial creditors wish to redeem their partial interests from a foreclosure of
the whole? How is this situation complicated further if there is a lienor
junior to both of them, but whose lien encumbers the whole? Exactly
what are the applicable redemption periods, and when do they run?
6 7
Unless and until the legislature acts, considerable controversy will
remain over where the no-partial-redemption rule ends and its excep-
tion begins. In the end, perhaps the best way to resolve this difficulty is
for the General Assembly to eliminate the Energy Fuels exception entirely
and to return the law of foreclosure to the predictable and long-standing
rule of no partial redemption.
67. The most senior junior lienor has ten days to redeem, followed by subsequent
lienors each with five days. See supra text accompanying notes 15-20. If partial redemption
is allowed, then lienors may be senior as to one undivided half of the property, but junior
as to the other, requiring the public trustee to keep track of parallel sets of redemption
periods.
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